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UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK 1937-1949 
by 
Francis E. Jones 
ABSTRACT 
Chinese-American diplomatic relations for the period 
1937-1949 developed into a very controversial subject. In 
considering this fact the questions arose as to what the 
American policy toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist 
government was and how that policy was implemented. 
Through a study of available material it has been 
determined that the consistent American policy was to fully 
support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. 
Chiang was the leader of the most stable faction within China 
and consequently gave promise of being able to serve Ameri-
can interests. For this reason he was selected as the agent 
with whom the United States would treat with in China. 
During the years 1937-1949 the United States furnished 
Chiang Kai-shek's government a considerable amount of mate-
rial and financial aid. Financial assistance was the domi-
nant form of aid furnished because American neutrality laws 
precluded most other forms of assistance. In furnishing 
financial aid to China during this period President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt was forced to find ways to maneuver around the 
2 
the neutrality laws. After 1941, the United States was 
unable to furnish any large amounts of material assistance 
to China for the war in Europe consumed the larger portion 
of American production and during the war years, 1942-1945, 
aid given China was small compared to that sent to other 
Allied nations. Because of the comparatively small quantity 
of aid the United States could send to China, President 
Roosevelt developed the policy of bestowing "great power" 
status upon China despite British and Russian objections. 
In following the policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, Pres-
ident Roosevelt made concessions to Chiang in order to 
placate the Chinese leader, promote more cordial relations, 
and keep China in the war. 
Opposition developed, during the late war years, 
among American officials to unqualified support of Chiang 
Kai-shek. Some American officials thought that Chiang was 
merely taking all of the American aid he could get, then con-
serving his forces for a future struggle with the Chinese 
Communists for control of China. There is evidence to 
support this viewpoint. 
Going into the postwar years, 1945-1949, American 
policy was still inclined to support Chiang Kai-shek in his 
position of leadership. During this period American policy 
changed as the United States government came to favor a uni-
fied coalition Chinese government although retention of 
3 
Chiang Kai-shek as head of that government was still favored 
despite the fact that some American officials advocated 
dropping Chiang. 
In an attempt to bring order into the chaotic inter-
nal conditions of China due to the civil war, the mission to 
China of General George c. Marshall was arranged. The 
Marshall Mission ultimately failed to bring about an ag~ee-
ment between the Nationalists and the Communists and the 
civil war continued. A final effort on the part of the 
United States to find some effective means of supporting 
Chiang Kai-shek and keeping him in power came in July, 1947, 
when the fact finding mission to China of General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer was arranged. His mission also failed to bring 
about any concrete results in regard to assisting Chiang 
Kai-shek. Recommendations in Wedemeyer's report, if fol-
lowed, would have required a commitment of American troops 
far larger than the United States was willing to make. The 
American government was caught in a dilemma: a decision was 
necessary but the American people would not support sending 
large numbers of troops, Chiang would not follow American 
suggestions and Russia was a constant threat. Once again, 
America was "too late with too little" and the mainland was 
lost to Chiang and Chiang's value as America's agent in 
China was destroyed. 
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Chinese-American relations for the years 1937-1949 
have proven to be a very controversial subject. For many 
people the subject has provided an opportunity to criticize 
American policy and the ultimate failure of American efforts 
to keep Chiang Kai-shek in power on the China mainland. 
However, it is not the purpose of this study to cri-
ticize American policy nor to find fault with any of the 
officials involved 1n carrying on diplomatic relations with 
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government. The intent is to 
make a study of Chinese-American relations for the years 
1937-1949 with the purpose of determining what the policy of 
the United States was and how that policy was implemented. 
Research was confined primarily to Foreign Relations 
of the United States, diaries, memoirs, and writings of 
officials involved. Also used were the Congressional hear-
ings, Congressional Record, New York Times, and some periodi-
cals. 
Acknowledgement is made to Dr. Eugene R. Craine 
whose helpful suggestions and patient reading has helped 
immeasurably in the completion of this study. Also greatly 
appreciated was the assistance of Miss Margaret Van Ackeran 
and the staff of the Documents Department in locating some 
11 
of the material used in this study. Acknowledgment is also 
made to my sister-in-law, Mary Garrison Jones, for her 
patient work in typing the copies of this study. 
CHAPTER I 
PREWAR RELATIONS 1937-1941 
This study of Chinese-American relations for the 
period of 1937-1941 must necessarily take into consideration 
the Open Door policy, as it was known and applied previous 
to the year 1937. Instituted by Secretary of State John 
Hay, in the Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900, this policy 
meant the preservation of equal commercial opportunity and 
respect for the territorial integrity of China.l 
The original concept of the Open Door policy was ex-
panded in 1931 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in 
the non-recognition doctrine, combined with the Open Door 
policy the concepts of non-recognition and non-intervention. 
These dealt specifically with Manchuria but were aimed at 
Japan and what was considered to be Japanese aggression in 
Manchuria. 
Providing the circumstances of the time permitted a 
particular interpretation to be used, the Open Door policy 
meant whatever those applying it wanted it to mean. Thus, 
through the Open Door policy, the United States became a 
greater participant in Far Eastern affairs. 
loepartment of State Foreign Relations of the United 
States~~ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 
pp. 12~-~ 
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From 1937 to 1941 the Open Door policy developed two 
main tenets: The integrity of China and the equal treatment 
of all foreigners in China. 2 The Open Door policy was, in 
actuality, a device to prevent other powers from taking over 
areas of China and excluding the United States from them.3 
In consideration of the preceding facts the United 
States relations with Chiang Kai-shek became significant 
from the point of view that he was to be the tool through 
which American policy was to be carried out in the ensuing 
years. The American government, and more specifically 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, displayed this attitude 
in a subsequent series of actions in the years after 1937. 
In previous years the United States recognized and upheld 
the government or faction tha promised the stability that 
would best safeguard its own trade and investments. For 
this same reason President Chiang Kai-shek, as head of the 
Nationalist Government, was selected as the agent through 
which the United States would treat with China. That this 
was consistent with American policy may be seen in several 
incidents, such as the Tai-ping rebellion of 1848, and 
2John K. Fairbank, The United States in China 
(Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), 
p. 257. 
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later, the fact that recognition was withheld from Chiang 
Kai-shek himself until it became apparent that the Kuomintang 
government would not collapse. 
Additional evidence of American efforts to further 
the interests of the United States and to bolster the posi-
tion and morale of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese was the 
attempt by President Roosevelt to bestow the status of a 
"great power" upon China, while at the same time recogni- . 
zing that the chaotic internal conditions precluded this 
unless drastic changes were undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek 
and the Kuomintang. Possibly Roosevelt believed that the 
bestowing of "great power" status upon China would compensate 
for the limited amount of aid that would be given to her. 
The conferring of "great power 1 status and unqualified 
support of Chiang Kai-shek later created difficulties for 
the United States as did its insistence upon the Open Door 
policy. These difficulties became very apparent in Japanese-
American relations in the period of 1937-1941. 
The attitude of Japan and her intentions in regard to 
China were obvious to some people before 1937, and later 
events only confirmed their predictions and estimates. The 
Japanese move into North China served as a preview of events 
to come. 
Norman Peffer writing in Asia stated that: 
The area in which Japan is now paramount. 
will be extended •••• What now obtains in these 
provinces will then be true of a large part of 
North China ••• what now may seem to be only minor 
infractions of the rights of other nations trading 
with China will then aggregate a major encroachment 
on the position of Western Powers •••• In fact 
the beginning of ~he end of Western trade in China 
will have set in.~ 
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Further Japanese actions indicated in a greater de-
gree what their position was in regard to the Open Door in 
China. Despite the fact that they consistently maintained 
that they favored the Open Door and had no intention of vio-
lating it, in reality, they considered it an outmoded prin-
ciple which they referred to as an "attempt to apply to the 
conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and 
principles of the past."5 In areas of China under Japanese 
control the Open Door, in the sense of equal commercial 
opportunity, did not exist. The note of October 6, 1938, 
from the American government to the Japanese government 
clearly indicates that in the thinking of the United States 
the Japanese were not adhering to the principle of the Open 
Door. 6 
Other actions portraying the Japanese intent and 
4Norman Peffer, "Myth of the Open Door," Asia, Vol. 
36 (July, 1936), p. 435. 
5paul H. Clyde, United States Policy Toward China: 
Diplomatic and Public Documents, 18~9-ill.2 (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 19 O), pp. 308-12. 
6Ibid., pp. 304-8. 
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aspirations included such things as the attack on the United 
States Gunboat Panay on December 12, 1937. This occurred on 
a clear day and under no circumstances could it have been 
considered an accident.7 This was followed at a later date 
by an attack on the u.s.s. Tutuilla and the dropping of 
bombs near the United States Embassy at Chungking which in 
itself could have been a very serious act. Another act of 
the Japanese intended as a means of exerting pressure on 
America in order to force them out of China was the bombing 
of American Missions and missionaries such as the event re-
8 ported by Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson on October 26, 1938. 
Carrying their actions further, on December 22, 1938, 
Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier, formally 
announced that a "new order" h d come into being: Japan, 
China, and Manchuria, he explained, would henceforth be 
united in economic cooperation and defense against Communism. 
This none too subtle inference meant, along with other 
7Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1952), Vol. II, p:-T203. 
8u.s. Department of State, Press Release, October 
29l 1938 (Washington: Government Printihg Office, 1938), 
Vo. XIX, No. 474, p. 287. A message to Ambassador Johnson 
from Mr. A. Andahl, an American missionary at Tang-ho, Honan 
dated 7:20 P.M., October 26, 1938. The message stated that 
the wife and one daughter of Mr. Arthur E. Nyhus were wounded 
and another daughter killed in the bombing of Tungpeh, in 
which a flag marked building was deliberately destroyed. 
Mr. Nyhus was a member of the Lutheran Brethren Mission. 
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statements, that foreign nations would be excluded from 
trade and other enterprises within China in areas under 
Japanese control.9 
Japanese interference with American rights, as stipu-
lated under the Nine-Power Treaty, and interference with 
what was considered equality of opportunity by the United 
States increased steadily after 1937 as larger areas came 
under Japanese control and Japan was able to exercise a 
firmer grip on the areas she had conquered. These issues 
were taken up with the Japanese government through American 
diplomatic channels. The extent and the means by which 
Japan was eliminating American interests in China were clear-
ly shown in two notes presented to the Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Fumimaro Kon0ye, October 6, 1938, and on 
December 31, 1938, to Hachiro Arita. 
A significant feature of the two notes and the events 
preceding them is their reflection of the attitude of the 
United States in regard to the Chinese government and Chiang 
Kai-shek. The fact that the matters were taken up with the 
Japanese government is a recognition of actual conditions at 
that time. Chiang Kai-shek and the government of China were 
too weak or too incompetent to safeguard foreign interests 
9u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations: J81an, m.!-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 193 , 
Vol . I , p. 287 . 
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in China, this was shown by the fact that the Japanese were 
able to overrun so much Chinese territory. At the same time 
the refusal of the United States to recognize the govern-
ments that the Japanese set up in the conquered territories 
as legal governments indicates that the United States was 
supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government as strongly as 
circumstances of the moment would allow, since at this time 
the United States was still controlled by isolationist 
sentiment and influence. The isolationist attitude in the 
United States prevented the American government from taking 
any stronger stand in support of the Nationalist Government. 
American reaction to the Japanese as they effected 
the Open Door in China was, as previously mentioned, just to 
make representation to the Japanese government. Secondarily, 
realizing the weakness of the Chiang Kai-shek government, 
American officials took steps to protect American lives and 
property in China. Whenever and wherever situations of 
danger developed American citizens were advised to withdraw 
and assistance and means for doing this were furnished.lo 
In keeping with American policy in this regard, when 
the Japanese gave notice that they intended to attack the 
Chinese forces near Kuling, February, 1939, an American 
10s. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Meyers, Documents .QQ 
American Foreign Relations ill.§-1.2.12 (Boston: World Peace 
Foundation, 1939), p. 189. Hereinafter cited as Jones, Doc. 
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gunboat and an officer of the American Consulate General at 
Hankow were sent to assist in the withdrawal from Kuling to 
Kiukia.ng.ll Further indication of American policy in regard 
to removing nationals from danger areas came with the com-
mencement of hostilities around Sian. In this instance the 
American government gave notice to Ambassador Nelson T. 
Johnson in China that the American government was willing to 
stand the expense in removing American nationals by air if 
air evacuation was thought necessary in order to protect 
American lives.12 
Protection of American property in China also de-
manded the attention of the American government following the 
beginning of the Chinese-Japanese conflict in 1937. For this 
purpose, as well as to protect American citizens, the United 
States kept detachments of the armed forces in various 
places in China under the provisions of the Boxer Protocol 
of 1901. Stated officially the purpose of maintaining 
troops in China was "to contribute to the protection of 
American nationals (including diplomatic personnel) and in 
case of emergency calling for their evacuation, making 
llDepartment of State, Press Release, March 4, 1939 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), Vol. xx, 
No. 492, p. 189. 
12Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, l.2.32 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1954), Vol. IV, p. 554. Hereinafter cited as E• li• 
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available an armed escort.nl3 Carrying out this purpose 
American detachments were located at three points, Peiping, 
Tientsin, and Shanghai. This practice of the American 
government could only be recognized as another indication 
that it regarded the Chiang Kai-shek government as too weak 
and incompetent to provide adequate protection for foreign 
nationals within China, although it continued to support 
Chiang Kai-shek as the only available instrument in carry-
ing out American policy and attempting to preserve American 
interests in China. 
Orientation of American policy in support of China 
essentially stemmed from Secretary of State Cordell Hull's 
ideas and frame of mind. It is clear that on his assumption 
of the office of Secretary of St te, Hull possessed defi nite 
convictions relevant to China and the Far Ea.st for he has 
stated: 
As I entered the State Department I had two points 
on the Far East firmly in mind. One was the definite 
interest the United States had in maintaining the 
independence of China and in preventing Japan from 
an equally definite conviction that Japan had no 
intention whatever of abiding by treaties but would 
regulate her conduct by the opportunities of the 
moment.14 
Later Japanese actions closely followed the concept 
13Jones, Doc., p. 186. 
14cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1948), Vol. I, p. 270. 
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as expressed in Secretary Hull's second point. American re-
actions to the flagrant Japanese disregard of American 
rights, in addition to such aets as taking over Hainan and 
the Spratly Islands, launched some discussion of retaliation 
against Japan. Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson at Chungking was 
among those who favored the American government taking strong-
er action. 15 However, the prevailing opinion was that the 
time had not come for such a policy. 
In 1937 Congress and the American people regarded 
American interests in China as too trivial to risk war with 
Japan. Evidence of this was presented in American reaction 
to the sinking of the Panay. "The apathy and lack of spirit 
in response ••• testified to the disinterest in Asia. 1116 
However, the prompt apology and payment of an indemnity by 
the Japanese government contributed a great deal toward 
eliminating any lasting American concern over the sinking of 
the Panay. 
Chiang Kai-shek expressed his feelings relevant to 
the Japanese incursions into China and their effect on the 
Open Door by appealing to the League of Nations for sanctions 
15William L. Langer and S. Gleason, The Challenge to 
Isolation, .!232-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 
p. 52. 
16Robert A. Goldwin, Ralph Lerner, and Gerald Stourz, 
(eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), p. 278. 
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against Japan and inquiring whether the United States would 
be willing to take parallel action with the League. Ameri-
ca's and the League's response to the Chinese was such as to 
make their efforts futile. The League of Nations refused to 
adopt a resolution, and the United States was unwilling to 
declare sanctions.17 
The Brussels conference, November 3rd to 24th, 1937, 
had the same negative results. All of the participants in 
the conference, members of the League and parties to the 
Nine-Power Treaty, refused to take any action against Japan 
or to give any aid to China unless the United States would 
take some positive action.18 This the American government 
was unwilling to do. The nations of the world had received 
some hope that the United State might be willing to under-
take some form of action against Japan, for just before the 
conference convened, President Roosevelt had delivered his 
"quarantine" address at Chicago on October 5, 1937, in which 
he called for collective action against aggressor nations. 
Public reaction to this speeeh, a nation wide protest from 
Democrats as well as Republicans, quickly made the President 
retract any thoughts along such lines at that time. 
17E• R•, 12.3.§, Vol. III, P. 518. 
18Herbert Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 15. 
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Supporters of economic sanctions against Japan re-
ceived little encouragement until 1938. Application of the 
so-called "moral embargo" was the first official achievement 
of this group.19 Additional impetus was given to the concept 
of economic sanctions by the decision of the American govern-
ment to terminate in 1939 the commercial treaty with Japan. 
Following the termination of the commercial treaty 
events drawing China and America closer together moved rap-
idly resulting in greater aid and benefits to the Chiang 
Kai-shek government. Japanese-American relations had de-
clined to the point where, by July, 1941, the United States 
was ready to take drastic measures. On f uly, 26, President 
Roosevelt issued an order freezing Japanese assets in the 
United States thereby cutting off all Japanese trade.20 
American relations with Japan continued to deterio-
rate until the fateful day of November 26, 1941, when 
Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, 
handed the Japanese representative the memo which terminated 
diplomatic relations. The Japanese did not accept the terms 
of the American note for they would have had to relinquish 
territory acquired through several years of warfare. 
19Department of State, Peace and~: United States 
Foreign Policy, 193141941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 70. 
20~., pp. 421-22. 
Previous to the delivery of the fateful note of 
November 26, 1941, the American government was giving con-
sideration to the idea of a truce or temporary agreement 
13 
or more properly phrased, a modus vivendi. Led by Chinese 
Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese diplomatic and special 
agents violently objected and virtually bombarded Secretary 
Hull and the American government with a storm of protests 
against any such possible arrangement as a modus vivend1.21 
In addition to ~hese activities Chiang Kai-shek personally 
protested the proposed American plan for a temporary agree-
ment. As confirmed by Secretary of State Hull, Chiang "sent 
numerous hysterical cable messages to different cabinet 
officers and other high officials in the government other 
than the State Department sometimes ignoring the President. 
1122 . . . Relative to this situation and other similar condi-
tions Chiang Kai-shek kept his brother-in-law, T. V. Soong , 
in Washington to pry and meddle in government affairs and to 
acquire as much as possible for China in the way of aid. 
Secretary Hull, after conversations with President 
Roosevelt on November 25, 1941, suddenly and completely 
dropped the idea of a modus vivendi and gave Soburo Kurusu 
21charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the 
Comif{; War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 
p. 51 • 
22Ibid. 
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and the Japanese Ambassador Admiral Kichisoburo Nomura the 
note of November 26 which the Japanese considered an ulti-
matum and to which they answered by the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.23 
The following note, dated November 25, 1941, from Owen 
Lattimore, an American political advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, 
explains Secretary Hull's sudden decision to abandon attempts 
to work out a temporary agreement with Japan. 
After discussion with the Generalissimo ••• I 
feel you should urgently advise the President of 
the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have 
never seen him really agitated before. Loosening 
of the economic pressure or unfreezing would danger-
ously increase Japan's military advantage in China. 
A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has 
its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any 
''modus vivendi" now arrived at with Japan would be 
disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous 
to the closing of the Burma Rad, which permanently 
destroyed British prestige. J apanese and Chinese 
defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting 
disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against 
occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either 
past assistance or increasing aid could compensate 
for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. 
The yeneralissimo has deep confidence in the 
President's fidelity to his consistent policy 
but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo 
questions his ability to hold the situation together 
if the Chinese national trust in America is under-
mined by reports of Ja~~n•s escaping military defeat 
by diplomatic victory. 
23oepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Japan: illl-1941 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1943), Vol. II, pp. 768-70. 
24united States Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on 
the Pearl Harbor Attack, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack, Report of Joint Committee, 79th Cong. 1 2nd Sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946J, p. 37. 
15 
In Chinese-American relations prior to 1941 the 
Neutrality laws and their revision and repeal became signif-
icant in considering the support of China and Chiang Kai-
shek. The first neutrality act was passed in the House of 
Representatives on August 23, 1935, and had been passed just 
two days previously in the Senate, where it was known as 
Senate Joint Resolution 173. The Act passed both houses of 
Congress by unanimous votes, reflecting the strong isola-
tionist attitude of the American people and Congress. 25 
This act and the subsequent Act of 1937 were "designed to 
forestall a repetition of such a calamity as World War 10 1126 
What they accomplished in fact was to establish a rigid 
government control over the shipment of munitions abroad in 
addition to prohibiting the expor t of arms to belliger ent 
nations, as well as forbidding private loans or credit to 
nations at war. They also authorized the President t o for-
bid travel by Americans on the ships of nations at war. 27 
Speaking in behalf of the neutrality legislation, 
25congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), Vol. 87, 
Part 7, p. 7952. 
26William L. Langer, and S. Everett Gleason, The 
Challenge to Isolation, 12.32-l2.2.Q (New York : Harper and 
Brothers, 1952), p. 14. Hereinafter cited as Langer, 
Challenge 1Q. Isolation. 
27Ibid. 
16 
isolationist Senators Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, Homer 
T. Bone of Washington, and Bennet Champ Clark of Missouri 
expressed the opinion that: 
••• the munitions interests whose profits the 
stay-out-of war legislation seriously affects, and 
those who wish us to act as policemen for the world, 
oppose the neutrality law. The passage of that law 
had the overwhelming support of the people for the 
very reason that it protected the country against 
war for the sake of profits for a few individuals, 
and prevented the government from forcing the 
country into the role of world policemen.28 
The provision within the neutrality law permitting 
the President to proclaim when a state of war existed 
allowed the Chinese to get the badly needed ammunition and 
other supplies from the United States during the early 
stages of the Chinese-Japanese conflict. This was possible 
because President Roosevelt refrai ed from issuing the pro-
clamation in 1937. Such a course of action was possible 
only because both the Chinese and Japanese governments also 
refrained from issuing a declaration of war because of their 
fear that the war materials they were receiving from the 
United States would be halted due to the provisions of the 
Neutrality law.29 
Other means of getting war supplies to China were 
28congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2187. 
29sumner Wells, The Time for Decision (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1944'Y,p-;-2W. 
17 
also resorted to as the case of the 2•2• Wichita illustrates. 
Following the Japanese occupation of Tientsin and the block-
ading of the East Coast of China in August, 1937, President 
Roosevelt stopped the transporting of war materials to China 
in government owned ships.3° Only a short time after the 
2•2• Wichita was stopped, while en route to China, the planes 
on board were delivered to China through the British by way 
of Hong Kong. Thus, in spite of the neutrality laws the 
United States found ways of aiding and supporting China and 
Chiang Kai-shek. Due to the fact that Japan was increas-
ingly becoming a threat to American interests in China and 
elsewhere in the Far Fast such actions became an integral 
part of American policy for any means of giving aid was 
acceptable that was detrimental to apan and beneficial to 
the United States. 
The provisions of the Neutrality law of 1937 greatly 
hampered the American effort to provide supplies of war 
material to the allied nations as the conflict in the Far 
East and in Europe reached its advanced stages during 1939. 
Consequently, President Roosevelt sought revision of the 
1937 Act, especially the removal of the embargo on arms ship-
ments. 
30Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Foreign 
Policy, 12.ll-1941 (New York: w. Funk, Inc., 1942), p. 190. 
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Speaking out in support of his desire for revision of 
the 1937 Act and removal of the arms embargo, the President 
in a message to a special session of Congress on September 
21, 1939, stated: 
The enactment of the embargo provisions did more 
than merely reverse our traditional policy ••• it 
gave a definite advantage to one belligerent as 
against another, not through his own strength or 
geographic position, but through an affirmative 
act of ours. Removal of the embargo is merely 
reverting to the sounder international practice, 
and pursuing in time of war as in time of peace 
our ordinary trade policies •••• 31 
From this it is clearly evident that the President 
wanted the neutrality restrictions loosened in order to have 
greater freedom in providing war supplies to other nations 
in line with American policy as he was attempting to develop 
it. 
The later act or legislative bill which became the 
Neutrality Act of 1939 was, for the most part, written by 
Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. Among those supporting the drive for re-
peal of the embargo in neutrality legislation were the 
American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts (composed of the 
representatives of such organizations as the League of 
Nations Association, the World Alliance for the International 
Friendship through the Churches, the Institute of Interna-
31congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8023. 
19 
tional Education, The American Youth Congress, and the 
General Federation of Women's Clubs) and the Non-Partisan 
Committee for Peace Through Revision of the Neutrality Law, 
of which William Allen White assumed the chairmanship.32 
Strenuously opposing a move to repeal or revise the 
existing neutrality legislation were such organizations as 
the Anti-War Mobilization, The Women's International League 
for Peace, the National Council for the Prevention of War, 
the Keep America Out of War Congress, and World Peaceways.33 
The Neutrality Act of 1939, as finally passed, largely con-
tinued the provisions of the Act of 1937, including the 
"cash and carry" provisions.34 Further action on repeal of 
embargo provisions had to wait until 1941, when isolationist 
influence had declined to a poi nt where Congressional action 
along these lines could be taken. Until this was achieved, 
President Roosevelt consistently urged that such action was 
needed and necessary. 
Even wit~ its restrictions it was unlikely that the 
Act of 1939 would have to be invoked unless the President or 
Congress found that when war actually broke out it was 
321anger, Challenge to Isolation, p. 225. 
33Ib1d. 
34united States Statutes at Large, 76th Cong., 2nd 
and 3rd Sess., 1939-1941 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1941), Vol. 54, Part I, pp. 4-12. 
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necessary in order to promote the security or preserve the 
peace of the United States. This provision was a compromise 
in the struggle between Congress and the President over the 
extent of executive discretion in determining whether and 
when to put neutrality legislation into effect.35 
Other legislation which was intended to prevent 
American participation in the international fracas included 
the Johnson Act which was passed for the purpose of pre-
venting private loans to belligerent nations. This bit of 
legislation resulted from the misconception created by the 
Nye Committee report on World War I. Consequently, the 
various forms of neutrality legislation passed and put into 
operation forced President Roosevelt and the American govern-
ment to find means outside the neutrality laws to provide 
aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Even though this support was 
limited and was intended only to keep the Chiang Kai-shek 
government from collapsing, it did serve to implement Ameri-
can policy and indicated the American government's recogni-
tion of the necessity of maintaining Chiang Kai-shek to 
serve American interests. Such was the American position in 
carrying out unneutral acts in contradiction of American 
neutrality legislation. 
35A. w. Dulles "Cash and Carry Neutrality, 11 Foreign 
Affairs (January, 1940), p. 192. 
Additional American efforts to assist China led to 
the formation and rather unique position of the American 
Volunteer Group (AVG) in China. Their very presence in 
... 7 , p 
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China before the Japanese-American conflict began was a vio-
lation, or at least a contradiction, of a previously sub-
mitted official statement given to the Japanese Foreign 
Office in 1937. This message stated that the American 
government would do everything within its legal power to 
discourage or deter Americans from fighting in foreign ser-
vices, meaning of course Chinese.36 The extent of the con-
tradiction is apparent in the manner in which the American 
Volunteer Group (AVG) was formed. 
Claire L. Chennault, who later became commander of 
the American Volunteer Group, had gone to China at the out-
break of the Chinese-Japanese conflict and became an officer 
in the Chinese Air Force. In addition the Chinese had been 
discussing with two other Americans, Mr. William D. Pawley 
and Lt. Commander Bruce Leighton (U.S.N.R.-Retired), the 
possibility of using their influence and business organi-
zations in placing American air power in China.37 Pawley 's 
36nepartment of State, Foreign Relations .Qf 
United States, Japa4, ill!.-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19 3), p. 339 
37charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's 
Mission to China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
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position as Vice-President or Curtis-Wright Corporation and 
owner of the Central Aircrart Manut·acturing Company, which 
had been making planes for the Chinese government in its fac-
tory at Loiwing, China, contributed to the feasibility of the 
plan.38 Added impetus was given to the project of placing an 
American air group in China when on October 18, 1940, Chiang 
Kai-shek took his problems to Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson. 
Reasons for Chiang Kai-shek's concern, over China's lack of 
air power, were that the Japanese blockade had weakened China 
considerably and the Russian-German non-aggression pact had 
stopped assistance from Russia. Chiang Kai-shek was afraid 
the Japanese would take Singapore or cut the Burma Road, con-
sequently, he thought that before this happened China had to 
have economic aid as well as planes manned by American volun-
teers to prevent the collapse of Chinese resistance. 
Early in 1941, the American government approved a 
plan which permitted American fighter planes pilo t ed by 
volunteer American pilots and maintained by American ground 
crews to fight against Japan in the service of China.39 
1953), p. 10. Hereinafter cited as Romanus, Stilwell's 
Mission. 
38c1are Booth, "AVG Ends its Famous Career,n Life 
(July 20, 1942), p. 2. 
39Department of State, Q•£• Relations with China~ 
1944-12±2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949J, 
p. 28. Hereinafter cited as Relations with China, 1944-12.i2. 
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The American group became a unit of China's armed forces by 
an order issued by Chiang Kai-shek dated August 1, 1941.40 
This brought up the question of the group's status. In view 
of the circumstances and the situation at that time it be-
came apparent that they were then out of the jurisdiction of 
the government of the United States. Under these circum-
stances they were completely dependent upon the mercy of the 
Japanese if they were captured. Technically the American 
government could not even protest if any of the pilots re-
ceived ill treatment if captured or forced down by the 
Japanese. 
Although the American Volunteer Group was not sup-
ported by lend-lease in the formative stage, lend-lease 
money was used at a later date to purchase supplies. The 
first lend-lease money used was for spare parts and was 
granted as a result of Chennault's request of November, 1941.41 
The conclusion to the era of the American Volunteer Group 
came in July, 1942 when it was attached to the United States 
Tenth Air Force, which had units in both India and China. 
In l~rch, 1943, the Tenth Air Force in China was succeeded by 
the Fourteenth. 
4oibid. 
41Mward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: eapon ill 
Victory ( ew York: Macmillan Company-;-I'944), p. 117. 
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Operations of the American Volunteer Group in China 
bring into view another aspect of Chinese-American relations, 
that of loans to China. The first thirty-six planes for 
China were paid for by the Universal Trading Corporation in 
a cash sale amounting to $8,900,000. 42 This agency had re-
ceived, through the Export-Import Bank, one of the earlier 
loans from the United States to China. 43 Such action re-
veals the method by which the American government extended 
loans to China. The Johnson Act prohibited large private 
loans to nations at war; however, the American government 
adopted the attitude that there was nothing in the law to 
prevent the Federal Government from making such loans through 
government agencies such as the Export-Import Bank or the Re-
construction Finance Corporation . Earlier American loans to 
China were not as large as later loans, and loans through 
the Export-Import Bank, at least in part, were to be repaid. 
Financial assistance to China was thus complicated by Ameri-
can laws and the Chinese government's acute financial situ-
ation and inability to repay loans. This situation pre-
vailed until December 1, 1940 when actual outright grants 
of loans and credits for military aid were given to Chiang 
Kai-shek's government. 
42Ibid. 
43Romanus, Stilwell's Mission, p. 7. 
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In 1934, the United States began a silver purchase 
program which had a drastic effect on the Chinese economy 
owing to the large amounts of silver smuggled out of China. 
To remedy this, Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
manipulated the silver purchase program so that it would be 
a direct aid to China. He accomplished this by paying the 
Nationalist government gold or United States dollars for five 
hundred million ounces of silver. In the period 1937-1939, 
one hundred eighty four million dollars were paid on this 
account.44 
Following the silver purchase arrangement there was 
an agreement of July, 1937, with the Central Bank of China 
in which the Secretary of the Treasury agreed to purchase 
Chinese Yuan up to an amount equivalent to fifty million 
dollars.45 The July, 1937, agreement was followed by a simi-
lar one in April, 1941.46 Stabilizing the Chinese currency 
was the purpose of these agreements. 
After 1937 the increasingly aggressive actions of the 
Japanese forced the United States to face the alternatives 
of either imposing economic sanctions on Japan or supplying 
44John K. Fairbank, The United States and China 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UniversityPress, 1958), 
p. 260. 
45y.2• Relations with China, 1944-12!!:.2, p. 31. 
46Ibid. 
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economic aid to China. Economic aid for China was the plan 
adopted, in part, as a result of increasingly insistent 
appeals from Chiang Kai-shek for American aid. Responding 
to Chiang's requests, President Roosevelt requested Secre-
tary of the Treasury Morgenthau "to do everything he could 
within legal limits. 1147 Secretary Morgenthau diligently set 
about doing this with the result which some writers in the 
American press referred to as a series of discriminatory 
loans to China. The meaning was that every loan given to 
the Chiang Kai-shek government was intended as a counter 
measure or counter action against a previous or contemplated 
Japanese action. 
First of the series of loans was a credit of 
$25,000,000 extended through the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation to the Chinese Nationalist government on December 
15, 1938. 48 The loan itself resulted from requests for more 
aid by the Chinese government which began in July, 1938, and 
became more insistent. In September, 1938, a special mis-
sion was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau in the hopes of completing the loan arrangement. 49 
471anger, Challenge to Isolation, p. 44. 
48Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1952), Vol. II, p. 1208. Hereinafter cited 
as Grew, Turbulent Era. 
491anger, Challenge to Isolation, p. 44. 
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Loan arrangements were completed against the advice of Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull, who maintained the Japanese 
would interpret the loan as something more than a commercial 
transaction and would think that its intent was to aid China 
in military resistance against Japan.5° 
Secretary Hull's opinion in regard to the Japanese 
reaction was borne out as indicated in a report from 
Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo which stated: 
With regard to the credit of $25,000,000 extended 
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the 
Chinese National Government, the Foreign Minister 
(Japanese) said to the foreign press correspondents 
on December 19, 1938, that such reported loans will 
necessarily prolong the hostilities to the consequent 
embarrassment and inconvenience of foreign nationals; 
that this is a regrettable act on the part of the 
United States which has hitherto acted with discre-
tion and understanding in Chinese affairs; and if it 
is a political gesture f the United States toward 
Japan, Arita thinks there will be "nothing more 
dangerous." The Japanese people he said, may con-
sider that the present loan is really intended as 
economic pressure by a powerful economic unit, and 
its results will prove quite tbe contrary to what 
is expected in America •••• 51 
The loan was tempered to offset Japanese offense by 
including in its provisions that the funds could not be used 
to buy arms and munitions, although they could be used to 
purchase other war supplies badly needed by Chiang Kai-shek 
50Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. II, p. 1208. 
511anger, Challenge to Isolation, Vol. II, pp. 44-5. 
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at that time.52 
As events moved on into 1939, the European war can-
celled Chinese hopes for aid from friendly nations in that 
area. In realization of this the Chinese again turned to 
the United States. Again in line with American policy of 
aiding the Chiang Kai-shek government, but not to the extent 
of intervention, two loans of $45,000,000 were granted to 
the Chinese owned Universal Trading Corporation through the 
Export-Import Bank. 53 The loan provisions stipulated that 
use was to be restricted to purchases of civilian supplies. 
In 1940, T. V. Soong came to the United States to ask 
for arms and more credit. International circumstances were 
in his favor for a successful loan negotiation at that time. 
Japanese-American relations were rapidly declining and 
German successes in Western Europe revealed approaching 
danger for the United States. As a result another loan of 
$20,000,000 was granted to the Nationalist government in 
March, 1940. 54 
This loan was followed on September 25, 1940, by 
52Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American 
Neutrality, 12.32-1941 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1955), p. 70. Hereinafter cited as Drummond, The 
Passing of American Neutrality. 
53Romanus, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 7. 
54Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, p. 137. 
29 
another of $25,000,000 for currency stabilization.55 View-
ing the train of events in the Far Ea.st at that particular 
time, the significance of the loan to China has another 
meaning as it came after the occupation of northern Indo-
China by Japanese troops and the issuance of Ambassador 
Grew's "green light" message recommending more stringent 
economic measures. In addition, the loan was succeeded the 
following day by an embargo on the export of all scrap iron 
and steel to Japan by order of President Roosevelt.56 
Continuing their requests for aid, the Chinese issued 
another plea in October, 1940, for arms and equipment.57 
None of the previous loans permitted the purchase of arms 
for the Chiang Kai-shek government. A further incentive for 
the Chinese to strive for the s@curing of a loan to buy arms 
was that the Japanese occupation of Northern Inde-China had 
closed the Yunnan-Indo-China Railway, leaving the Burrra Road 
as China's only connection to the outside world. 
Yielding to Chinese insistence, and even more to 
Japanese actions, the United States early in December, 1940, 
approved a loan of $100 ,000,000.58 Half of the loan, the 
55rbid., p. 175. 
56Ibid. 
57Romanus, Stilwell's Mission 1Q. China, p. 8. 
58 111oans for China", Business Week (December 7, 
1940) , p • 5 5. 
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part extended through the Export-Import Bank, went to fi-
nance immediate purchases of necessary war materials in the 
United States. The other $50,000,000 came from the Treasury 
Department's stabilization fund and was used to support the 
Chinese currency. Allowing twenty-five per cent of the loan 
to be used to purchase arms for China, the United States 
took the first step in the move toward furnishing military 
aid for the government of Chiang Kai-shek, although it was 
furnished later on a much larger scale.59 
Reviewing the series of loans to China it is obvious 
that the dominant form of American assistance was financial. 
This program was continued from 1942, with the $500,000,000 
credit extension on into and after the war years, with con-
tinuing American financial, material, and technical aid. 
But in reconsidering the China loans of 1940, it is 
their timing that gives them political significance. The 
first coincided with the establishment of the Nanking 
puppet government; the second was made on the eve of Japan's 
joining the Axis; and the third was announced on the day of 
Tokyo's official recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime. 60 
Thus, each was considered as a countermove against Japan 
59Romanus, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 11. 
60Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 221. 
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with the hope that each loan would strengthen and encourage 
the Kuomintang government to keep up Chinese resistance to 
Japan, which was, of course, in the best interests of the 
United States. 
An interesting sidelight in regard to the loans 
granted to China was the Congressional attitude against any-
thing which might involve the United States in a war and the 
full recognition of this aspect by President Roosevelt. 
Being fully aware that the attitude in Congress would pre-
vent passage of any measure for assistance to China he did 
not work out a plan for aiding China and seek the approval 
of Congress and the public. Instead the President resorted 
to other means of giving aid to China by maneuvering around 
the existing neutrality leg· s1ation. 
Aside from the loans to China, which were merely an 
instrumental part of American policy, there was some aid 
given to China out of purely benevolent and altruistic mo-
tives. Such was the United China Relief. In this the Ameri-
can public found a way of expressing its sympathetic attitudee 
A contribution of $1,250,000 was given in 1940 and approxi-
mately twice this amount was given in 1941. 61 This consci-
entious response was mainly due to the energetic work of 
such individuals as Pearl Buck and others with a sincere 
61Ib1d., p. 223. 
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interest in China. 
CHAPTER II 
WAR RELATIONS 
Relations between Chiang Kai-shek and the United 
States during the years 1942-1945 were concerned primarily 
with events in the area which came to be known as the China-
Burma-India theater (CBI) of operations. The establishment 
of the CBI involved a considerable amount of difficulty, 
confusion, and misunderstanding between the United States 
and China. 
Despite the difficulties and confusion in Chinese-
American relations of this period, the overall policy of the 
United States in regard to China remained consistent with 
that of previous years. This polie ,r was one of using China 
to serve the interests of the United States and of making 
use of Chiang Kai-shek as the agent to deal with when a re-
presentative of China was necessary. However, Chiang Kai-
shek himself presented difficulties for the United States in 
attempting to implement its policy through the years. This 
became quite apparent as events began to unravel in the Far 
East during the war years and concessions of one form or 
another were made to Chiang Kai-shek in an effort to uphold 
and retain him as a necessary agent with whom the United 
States could deal. 
American military aid was sent to China, as 
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represented by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, 
as early as 1941. This came as a result of the declining 
world situation and the requests of the Chinese government. 
Such a request was that presented by Mao Pang-Tzo on November 
25, 1940, to the President's Liason Committee, the civilian 
agency co-ordinating foreign arms purchases in the United 
States. The request was for combat planes, parts, and 
crews.1 
The difficulties that arose in processing Chinese 
requests for arms made it apparent that some action was 
necessary to improve the handling of lend-lease to China. 
This was so because the Chinese requests usually did not 
contain complete data or other necessary information. 2 As a 
result of these conditions G eral George C. Marshall, 
American Arrey Chief of Staff, approved on July 3, 1941, the 
American Military Mission to China which was referred to as 
AMMISCA. In August, 1941, this military mission, commanded 
by Brigadier General John Magruder, undertook the problem of 
helping the Chiang Kai-shek government in carrying out the 
provisions of the lend-lease agreement and improving the 
lcharles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's 
Mission to China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1953), p-.-11. Hereinafter cited as Romanus: Stilwell's 
Mission to China. 
2Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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efficiency of the program.3 Diplomatically, the sending of 
this military mission to China was considered as a warning 
to Japan in the same manner as similar measures were which 
at that time were being carried out by the United States.4 
Shortly after this an air mission under Brigadier General 
Henry B. Clagget was sent to China. 
An additional move to strengthen and assist the 
Chinese came when, on the advice of Brigadier General 
Clagget, a program was set up whereby Chinese pilots were 
trained in the United States. The first group trained under 
this program arrived in the United States in October, 1941.5 
Within the realm of military aid to the Chiang Kai-
shek government there arose some of the bitterest contro-
versies to appear up to tha t time in Chinese-American rela-
tions. The most prominent of these disagreements involved 
General Joseph Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. Intermixed 
with the disagreement between these two commanders was also 
a serious disagreement between General Stilwell and Brigadier 
General Claire L. Chennault, Commander of American Air 
3Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 223. 
4Romanus, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 30. 
5Department of State y.§. Relations with China, 1944-
(Washington: Government Printing Office-;--I°9l+9), p. 29. 
Hereinafter cited as g.§. Relations with China, 1944-12!:2. 
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forces in China. 
In an effort to preserve the workings of the overall 
American policy in regard to China, President Roosevelt made 
concessions to Chiang Kai-shek and sacrificed the able lead-
ership of General Stilwell to placate the obstinate Chinese 
leader. 
General Stilwell, in an attempt to attain his central 
military objective, which was to strengthen the Chinese 
armies and bring their force to bear on the Japanese in 
Asia, ran counter to the ideas of Chiang Kai-shek on various 
points. To help in carrying out his plans Stilwell favored 
arming the Chinese Communist forces and using them against 
the Japanese, a step that Chiang would not approve.7 
Stilwell also wanted to reduc the size of the Chinese army, 
cutting it down to a smaller but better trained cohesive 
unit which could be used more effectively against the Japa-
nese. This also was not acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. 
Favored as well by Stilwell was a plan to unify the Chinese 
and American forces under his command in order to carry out 
a more effective deployment of troops. As usual this did not 
6Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), p-. 532. 
7carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 19ID, p. 123. 
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meet with the approval of the Chinese leader. 
The rift was widened by the dispute between Stilwell 
and General Chennault. Their difference of opinion resulted 
from the desire of Chennault to use the tonnage being flown 
into China over the "hump" to build up and strengthen the 
air units in China. Stilwell insisted that the air units 
would not be as effective against the Japanese as well 
trained and equipped ground units. For this reason Stilwell 
wanted the tonnage to be used to equip and supply his ground 
forces in China and Burma. In the ensuing controversy Chiang 
Kai-shek sided with General Chennault. The issue was even-
tually decided by President Roosevelt who favored the ideas 
of General Chennault. President Roosevelt's decision was, 
in part, due to the fact that t Chennault viewpoint re-
ceived a more favorable hearing in Washington. This was 
because Chennault's aid-de-camp, Captain Joseph Alsop, was a 
cousin of the President as well as a close friend of T. V. 
Soong.8 Captain Alsop also knew Harry Hopkins, one of the 
President's advisors, as well as many other influential 
persons in Washington and elsewhere as a result of his days 
as a Washington political columnist. 
Eventually the Chiang Kai-shek-Stilwell controversy 
8aeneral Albert c. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 201. 
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was closed when Major General George E. Stratemeyer suc-
ceeded Chennault and General Stilwell was replaced with 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer and brought back to the United 
States. The significant feature of these actions, which in 
actuality were concessions to Chiang, is that they were in-
tended to placate the Chinese leader, bolster his position, 
and keep China in the war. 
A New York Times report on the Stilwell controversy 
implied that the single-minded concern of Chiang Kai-shek on 
the issues involved had nothing to do with the war with 
Japan but tt,tat: 
The Generalissimo and his staff like the U.S. Air 
Force, which they get free and which asks for nothing 
except food and airfields, which we equip with build-
ings and installations. But the Chinese Government 
hedges and hesitates over everything involving the 
use of its armies. Foreigners can only conclude that 
the Chinese Government wants to save its armies to 
secure its political power after the war.9 
Lend-lease aid extended to China under the Act of 
March 11, 1941, became more important and useful to the 
Chinese than any of the loans of previous years. The be-
ginning of the lend-lease came when President Roosevelt 
announced in late 1940 a plan to eliminate the dollar sign 
from aid to the Allies.10 With extension of lend-lease to 
9~ York Times, October 31, 1944, p. 4. 
lOJames F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 221. 
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China the President made use of the occasion to make a some-
what dramatic gesture to China and Chiang Kai-shek with his 
statement, "China ••• expressed the magnificent will of 
millions of people ••• China, through the Generalissimo, 
has asked our help. America has said China shall have our 
help.nll This apparently was an effort to raise the de-
clining morale of the Chinese nation. 
E!xtension of lend-lease to China becomes more signi-
ficant after considering the Far Eastern situation at that 
time. The Japanese had moved into Northern Indo-China in 
September, 1940; and by July, 1941, they were taking over 
Southern Indo-China. Thus, it would be favorable to Ameri-
can interests if the Chinese maintained active military op-
erations and in this way function ed as a deterrent to ex-
tension of Japanese military operations on south. 
Even though lend-lease to China occasioned dramatic 
statements by President Rooseve l t and courteous replies by 
Chiang Kai-shek, very little equipment and material reached 
China as compared to the amount sent to other allied na-
tions. Fully aware of this fact, American officials were 
highly sympathetic to a request from the General i s simo for 
a five hundr ed milli on dollar loan; and on March 26, 1942 , 
llFoster Rhea Dulles, China and America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1946), ~221. 
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the United States and Chiang signed an agreement establishing 
the $500,000,000 as a credit in the name of the Chinese 
government.12 This loan to China was intended to compensate 
for the fact that at that time the United States was not 
able to furnish anything of greater military value to the 
Chinese. The loan, however, would show that America wanted 
to help China as much as possible. Such practices as this 
in handling relations with China came to be referred to by 
American diplomats as enlightened self-interest. 
During the wartime relations with China the insis-
tence of the United States in bestowing great power status 
on China in order to retain Chinese friendship while at the 
same time relegating the Nationalist government to a minor 
role became most conspicuous i n the international top level 
conferences which were held by the Allied war leaders during 
the years of the great conflict. Of all these conferences 
which took place, Chiang Kai-shek himself was present at 
only one of them, the conference at Cairo on November 22-26, 
1943. A representative of China participated at only two of 
the others, the First Quebec Conference of August, 1943, and 
the Moscow Conference in October, 1943. 
Absence of Nationalist Chinese delegates at the _ 
12u.s. Department of State Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1942 (Washington: ~overnment Printing Office, 
1956), P• 433. 
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conferences was explained in as subtle a manner as possible. 
At the Atlantic Conference of August, 1941, President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met and drew 
up the Atlantic Charter. Absence of a Chinese representa-
tive was explained away as being due to the fact that the 
United States was not at war and the problems discussed were 
of concern only to Britain and the United States. When the 
Casablanca Conference convened in January, 1943, China was 
not at war with Germany and so could not properly enter into 
an over-all discussion of full military strategy looking to 
the conquest of the Axis powers in both hemispheres.13 
With the convening of the First Quebec Conference of 
August, 1943, a representative of the Chinese government was 
present for the first time at t e high level meetings with 
T. V. Soong, the Chinese representative. The main points of 
discussion at this conference concerned the Italian sur-
render and the establishment of an international organiza-
tion. This explains the presence of Soong, for Chinese 
participation involving delibe~ation on an international 
organization would appeal to the Chinese and was in line 
with American insistence on conferring great power status on 
China. Also, there were no other points of discussion 
13congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 
P, 758. 
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involved in the conference in which the presence of a Chinese 
representative might interfere. Another of the conferences 
in which the Chinese participated was the Moscow Conference 
of October, 1943, in which the Chinese were permitted to sign 
the Joint Four Power Declaration although this came over 
Russian objection.14 
Not until the Cairo Conference of November, 1943, did 
Chiang Kai-shek participate in a conference with the major 
allied nations. At this conference President Roosevelt and 
Winston Churchill met with the Chinese leader, but Joseph 
Stalin did not take part in the meeting with the General-
issimo. At Cairo Chiang was promised that all territories 
Japan had taken from China would be restored and that the 
Allies would conduct an amphibious operation in the Bay of 
Bengal as part of the Burma campaign which would open the 
supply line to China.15 However, the promises given Chiang 
at Cairo were not fulfilled. The commitments to China were 
changed shortly thereafter, for following the meeting at 
Cairo, President Roosevelt went on to Teheran to meet with 
Joseph Stalin. Following Teheran and a second meeting at 
14s. B. Fay, "Meaning of the Moscow Conference," 
Current History (December, 1943), p. 292. 
15Department of State, Foreign Relations of~ 
United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 191±3_ 
(Washington: Government Printing Office,-"!961), pp. 4~9. 
43 
Cairo the plans developed in the first Cairo Conference for 
a campaign in Burma and greater aid to China were cancelled 
in favor of concentrating on the war in Europe. 
At the Yalta Conference of February, 1945, the ten-
dency of the United States to use China to serve American 
interests became more obvious than ever. During this con-
ference President Roosevelt agreed to grant Stalin his de-
mands for the Kurile Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin 
Island, internationalization of the Port of Dairen, the 
Lease of Port Arthur, and joint Russo-Chinese operation of 
the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads. 16 In 
addition the United States was to use its influence to have 
China agree to that part affecting China's territory. 17 
Thus, in the interests of the United States, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, in order to shorten the war against Japan, 
bargained away the rights and territory of China in return 
for Soviet participation in the war against the Japanese. 
Chiang Kai-shek, being involved in a war against the Japa-
nese and, more important to him, a war against the Chinese 
Communists, was in no position to disagree too strongly 
16nepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: The Conferences il Malta and Yalta, l~tt5 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), P• 9 • 
17James F. Byrnes1 Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 194'1), p. 42. 
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when the agreement was eventually presented to him at Chung-
king on June 15, 1945. The failure to notify Chiang Kai-shek 
of the Yalta agreement, according to Robert E. Sherwood, was 
due to the fear of the security of secrets in Chungking. 18 
The American ambassadors to China, along with the 
other officials involved with carrying out American policy 
in China, were having their difficulties in coping with the 
problems in the complex China situation. Following the re-
signation of Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in May, 1941, the 
post was taken over by Clarence E. Gauss. Gauss carried on 
the post as American Ambassador to China attempting to han-
dle the problems involved in Chinese-American relations un-
til, in disgust, he resigned in November, 1941. The resig-
nation of Gauss came as a resul c of the recall of General 
Joseph Stilwell. As reported by the New York Times, Mr. 
Gauss had long been an advocate of a "strong" policy in 
China.19 Like General Stilwell, Gauss believed that the 
United States should attach some definite qualifications to 
the aid which was being given to Chiang Kai-shek. The pur-
pose of any such qualifications attached to the aid to China 
would have been to get the Chinese leader to be a little 
18Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 86b. 
19.lifil! York Times, October 31, 1944, p. 4. 
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more willing to use his large armies against the Japanese 
instead of just getting the American aid and then holding 
back his armies for the future struggle with the Chinese 
Communists. 
Also involved in the complicated matter of carrying 
on United States relations with the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
ment was the controversial figure of Major General Patrick 
J. Hurley. Hurley received his appointment as personal rep-
resentative of President Roosevelt to China on August 18, 
1944 and arrived in Chungking on September 6, 1944. When 
Gauss resigned as Ambassador to China on November 1, 1944, 
Hurley was nominated to fill the position on November 30, 
1944, and was appointed Ambassador in December. 20 
Hurley's appearance and his actions while there in-
dicate that the United States was following its traditional 
policy which was to uphold Chiang Kai-shek. While in China, 
first as the President's personal representative and later 
as Ambassador to China, Hurley became involved in the com-
plex and controversial matter of trying to unify the fac-
tions in China into a cohesive unit of government. This in-
volved negotiations with the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-
shek, and independent Chinese groups. In this endeavor 
Hurley steadfastly supported Chiang Kai-shek while at the 
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same time thinking he could bring the Communists and the 
Kuomintang together on mutually agreeable terms. Under the 
circumstances this was not possible as neither group would 
make any actual concessions to the other. 
Evidence of the widely divergent ideas of the Commu-
nist and Kuomintang groups was first presented to Hurley 
soon after the negotiations began. To start the negotia-
tions Hurley went to Yenan to talk with the Communists and 
get their terms for accepting unification which were set 
forth in a five point proposal. Following this Hurley went 
back to Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-shek who pre-
sented his own three point plan for unification. The dif-
ferences in the ideas of both the Communists and the Nation-
alists, as presented in the original plans, existed as long 
as negotiations for unification were carried on. Neither 
group would accept a system which placed it in an inferior 
position. 
Throughout the period of his attempts to bring about 
unification in China, Hurley continued his unqualified 
support of Chiang, and in this matter he refused to consider 
the idea of using American aid as an element for inducing 
Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into some type of 
unified coalition government. However, on this point some 
of the foreign service officers in the Chungking Embassy 
differed with Hurley. Two of them in particular, George 
47 
Acheson and John Service, believed American aid should be 
used as an inducement to get Chiang to set up a unified, 
coalition government. Also they favored Stilwell's idea of 
arming the Chinese Communists in an effort to make them more 
effective against the Japanese. Hurley, with President 
Roosevelt's support, had the foreign service officials re-
moved who did not wholeheartedly support Chiang Kai-shek. 
The climax of Hurley's role in China affairs came 
while he was in Washington shortly after the death of Pres-
ident Roosevelt. Abruptly, in November, 1945, Hurley re-
signed stating that the President and the State Department 
had never made the China policy clear and at the same time 
accusing many of the foreign service officers and State 
Department officials of being p o-communist. 21 Hurley made 
these charges feeling that support of Chiang Kai-shek had 
not been great enough. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, 
in speaking of Hurley's charges, stated that: 
Of all the phases of our policy in the Far East, 
this seems to have been the clearest and most obvious. 
We formally recognize only the National Government. 
Our Ambassador is for the National Government. Our 
war supplies and financial assistance have been de-
livered only to the National Government •••• It 
is difficult to understand Hurley's intimation that 
his failure to achieve a satisfactory settlement of 
China's internal division resulted from the absence 
21Q•£• Relations with Chiapg, 1944-1.2:t.2, p. 581. 
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of a public expression of our policy.22 
Unfortunately for Ambassador Hurley, his vanity 
apparently prevented him from realizing that his failure in 
attempting to unify the Chinese was due to circumstances 
beyond his or any American's control and not due to those 
against whom he was making charges. When Hurley resigned, 
he became just another American official frustrated in the 
attempt to find a solution for one of the many complex pro-
blems in Chinese-American relations. 
The matter of aid to China entered into Chinese-
American relations in other ways. Another example was ex-
tremely noticeable in the trip of Wendell Wilkie to China in 
October, 1942. After arriving in China, Wilkie was given a 
most enthusiastic welcome by thP Chinese government, the 
press, and the civilian p~pulation. 23 This ·was confirmed by 
Ambassador Gauss who was in China at the same time. After a 
closer observance it is easily discernable why Wilkie re-
ceived such a welcome and why the Chinese were so enthusi-
astic in response to Wilkie's visit. 
Dr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
who was in Washington, informed his government of Wilkie's 
22Department of State, Bulletin (December 9, 1945), 
XIII, No. 337, pp. 930-31. 
23Department of State, Foreign Relations o~ the U~ited 
States, China, 1942 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1956), p. 161. 
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coming and recommended that the utmost effort be made to 
make Wilkie's visit a success and to do everything possible 
to win Wilkie's favor firmly in the cause of China.24 
Reasons for the special interest of the Chinese 
Nationalist government in Wilkie were quite obvious. The 
primary reason was that at that time there was a possibility 
of Wilkie's becoming President of the United States in the 
next election. Secondarily, it was thought that Wilkie 
might have a seat in the peace conference and there matters 
of great importance to China would be discussed and decided. 
From this it can be seen that the Chinese took advantage of 
every opportunity that might increase their aid from the 
United States or work to their advantage in any other way. 
For the United States, Wilkie's trip was mainly for the pur-
pose of a morale booster to let the Chinese know they had 
not been forgotten and America was doing everything possible 
to help them. This again was to serve the purpose of keep-
ing China in the war, America's main interest in China at 
that time. 
The Chinese war front proved to be of value to Pres-
ident Roosevelt in a way ordinarily not associated with 
diplomatic relations. China proved to be a convenient de-
pository for administration officials who became politically 
24..ll?.1,g,., p. 163. 
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embarassing to the President. The missions of Henry Wallace 
and Donald Nelson in the summer of 1944 indicate this. 
Supposedly, the Wallace mission was due to the concern for 
the Chinese in their shaky internal affairs between the 
Communists and Chiang's forces. But the real objective of 
the Wallace visit became apparent when he was dropped at the 
later party convention in Chicago. 25 Apparently, Wallace 
had become a political liability to President Roosevelt; 
consequently, a mission to China served the dual purpose of 
encouraging the Chinese to continue in their efforts and re-
moving Wallace from the political scene in the United Stat~s. 
In a similar manner, the mission of Donald Nelson to 
China was arranged. As stated, Nelson went to China for the 
purpose of discussion of postwar economic affairs with 
Chiang Kai-shek. However, previous to this assignment, 
Nelson, as chairman of the War Production Board, became in-
volved in the controversy with Charles E. Wilson, Vice-
Chairman. The issue involved was that Nelson favored be-
ginning a plan for reconversion to peace time operation of 
American industry to avoid the sudden cutbacks of cancella-
tion of wartime contracts. The controversy was one of 
several which had been criticized by Republican candidate 
25congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 
p. A3720. 
51 
Thomas E. Dewey. To solve the problem of a highly criticized 
internal squabble of the Administration, President Roosevelt 
sent Nelson to China and appointed Julius Krug as Acting 
Chairman of the War Production Board. 26 Thus in this case, 
as in a similar situation with Wallace, President Roosevelt 
conveniently arranged for a China mission for two individ-
uals who might otherwise have hindered operations in 
Washington and possibly interfered with the war effort in 
general. 
Further American efforts to soothe and elevate the 
Chinese, in lieu of greater aid, came when the process of 
visiting officials was reversed, such as Madame Chiang Kai-
shek's visit to the United States in November, 1943. While 
here, she was a guest at the Wh~te House and spoke to a 
joint session of the Houses of Congress as well as at a ral-
ly at Madison Square Garden and several public meetings. 27 
In 1943 acclaim and applause was about the most the United 
States could offer China since the capacity of production 
was being stretched to meet the great wartime needs. 
In accordance with the American policy to uplift the 
Chinese whenever possible, the United States signed a treaty 
26Eliot Janeway, "The Nelson Impact on China," Asia 
(March, 1945), Vol. 45, p. 123. 
27Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), P• 240. 
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in 1943, giving up extraterritoriality rights in China. 28 
However, the full effect of this was weakened when, within 
five months, another agreement was made freeing American 
troops in China from Chinese criminal jurisdiction. 29 For 
the most part these troops were the only Americans in China 
at the time so that under these circumstances giving up 
extraterritoriality meant comparatively little to the United 
States. 
A similar line of thought was followed in the repeal 
of the exclusion laws barring Chinese Nationals from the 
United States. This also meant comparatively little to the 
United States for in repealing the exclusion laws the Chinese 
were admitted upon a quota basis and the admission of 105 
Chinese per year would not ha e any great effect on the 
United States.30 Meanwhile, the action promoted more cor-
dial relations between America and the Chiang Kai-shek 
Government. 
28Relinguishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China 
and .1b£, Regulation of Related Matters, Treaty and acc ompa-
nying Exchange of Notes between U.S. and China, Treaty 
Series 987 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 
pp. 2-6. 
29nepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, China,~ (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1957), pp. 691-700. 
30Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 237. 
CHAPTER III 
POSTWAR RELATIONS 1945-1949 
Chinese-American relations of the postwar period be-
gan with the usual Chinese requests for American aid. Chiang 
Kai-shek's fortunes began to rise for a time due to the 
backing of the United States, but this was only temporary, 
and by the end of 1949 his usefulness to the United States 
came to an end as Communist forces took over on the mainland 
of China. For America the period 1945 to 1949 was one of 
disappointment, confusion, and indecision as far as relations 
with China were concerned. 
At the beginning of this period Chiang Kai-shek still 
held the unqualified support of the United States and was 
considered as still being necessary to the United States in 
maintaining its interests in China and the Far East. Be-
cause of Chiang's importance to the United States and also 
in response to a request from the Chinese National govern-
ment, plans were prepared for a military advisory group to 
assist the Chinese Nationalists. 
In April, 1946, a United States Military Advisory 
Group to China was authorized which was not to exceed one 
thousand officers and men.I Major General David G. Barr was 
lKeneth s. Latourette, The American Record in the Far 
East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), P• lo';. 
in command of the group although it was initially estab-
lished by General Albert C. Wedemeyer under the President's 
temporary war authority. 2 This group assisted the Chinese 
Nationalists until November 1, 1948. The action establish-
ing the group was in line with the American policy of 
strengthening the Nationalist government in order to keep it 
in power. The announced purpose of the advisory group was 
to assist the Chinese in the development of a modern armed 
force. In its relations with Chiang Kai-shek's forces the 
advisory group was not very successful in carrying out its 
stated purpose. Reports all indicated the Chinese lacked 
confidence in the advisory group and in a similar manner the 
advisory group lacked confidence in the Chinese.3 The 
Chinese would listen politely t o advice given them then fre-
quently ignore it if they did not like the advice. Likewise 
the advisory group had little respect for the ability of the 
Chinese. 
2united States Congress, Committee on Armed Services 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation 
in the Far Fast, Hearings before the committees, 82nd Cong., 
1st Sess., toconduct an inquiry into the military situa-
tion in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief 
of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assign-
ment in that area (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1951), p. 558. 
3Department of State, Y•2• Relations with China, 1~44-
l2!:,2 (Washington: Government Printing Office-;-I'91+9), p. 3 o. 
Hereinafter cited as Y•2• Relations with China, 1944-1:lt.2,. 
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On November 1, 1948, the Joint United States Military 
Advisory Group, known as JUSMAG, was activated.4 This group 
was better staffed and organized than its predecessor and 
the Commander of the previous group, Major General David G. 
Barr, was retained as commander. However, the deteriorating 
military situation in China during late 1948 led to its re-
moval before the end of the year.5 The Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group and the preceding advisory group 
accomplished very little while assisting the Chinese Nation-
alists. The short time that the group was in operation re-
duced the possibility of being successful in any great 
degree. 
At the close of World War II the problems of repa-
triating the large number of Japa~_ese, resisting the acti-
vities of the Chinese Communists, and occupying important 
areas necessary to the defense of the Nationalist position 
were reasons making it imperative that the United States 
give the Nationalists such assistance as that of the advi-
sory group. Also, during this period of Chinese internal 
conflict, an advisory group was the most acceptable form of 
assistance that could be given to Chiang Kai-shek for out-
right military intervention in the Chinese Civil War was 
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strongly opposed in the United States. Because of the 
strong opposition to American involvement in China, the advi-
sory group was allowed to act only in an advisory capacity 
with orders not to become involved in the Chinese Civil War. 
As the power of Chiang Kai-shek began to subside and 
the menace of Communist control of China became a greater 
possibility, the Nationalist government again turned to the 
United States for economic aid. In February of 1947, the 
Chinese request for additional economic assistance was 
announced. However, by this time the question of aid to 
China had become a controversial issue in American politics 
and probably even more controversial in diplomatic circles. 
Involved in the issue was the question of whether American 
aid to China was accomplishing its intended purpose or 
whether it was accomplishing anything at all. Also being 
questioned was the unqualified backing of Chiang Kai-shek. 
The American government now favored a coalition government, 
that is, a unified Chinese government including not only the 
Chinese Nationalists but also the Communists and other 
groups. Discussions in Congress on the requested aid to 
China brought forth such sarcastic references as "Operation 
Rathole."6 
6congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 
p. 3564. 
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While the Communists were becoming increasingly 
successful in their operations against the Nationalist 
government, Chiang Kai-shek looked to the United States for 
greater support. The American government continued its 
efforts to find a way, short of military involvement, to 
prevent the collapse of the Nationalist government. The 
American State Department officially recommended, on Febru-
ary 5, 1948, an appropriation of $570,000,000 for economic 
aid to China but made no recommendations for specific aid 
for military purposes.7 This was followed on February 18, 
1948, by a special message from President Harry s. Truman 
to Congress advocating aid to China in the amount of 
$570,000,000 for a fifteen month period. 8 
This attempt to provide aid to China culminated in 
the China Aid Act passed by Congress on April 2, 1948. As 
finally worked out and as specified in a bilateral agreement 
on July 3, 1948, the Nationalist government was to receive 
$275,000,000 for non-military supplies and $125,000,000 for 
other purchases.9 This last amount, it was assumed, would 
7Harley F. McNair and Donald Lach, Modern Far Eastern 
International Relations (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 
Inc., 1955), p. 545. Hereinafter cited as McNair, Modern 




be used by the Chinese to purchase military supplies. The 
aid granted at this time was later extended on April 14, 
1949. Other than the assistance given to Chiang Kai-shek 
under the 1948 act, a considerable quantity of military aid 
was given in transfer of material to the Nationalist from 
American forces in China. This included the equipment and 
supplies from the Marines stationed in North China, material 
from the Navy, and transfer of surplus equipment from other 
areas of the Pacific.10 
The importance of Chiang Kai-shek to the United 
States, as far as its interests in China were concerned, was 
still apparent to the American government. The aid granted 
to the Nationalists in the postwar years attests to this 
fact. As there was no other le ~der in China with whom the 
United States could deal, it became necessary to back the 
Nationalist government in spite of all criticism of the 
China aid program. 
Postwar relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government 
were viewed with renewed interest as a result of the resig-
nation of Ambassador Patrick Hurley on November 26, 1945. 
In clarifying the question raised by Hurley on recognition 
of the Chinese government, President Truman announced that 
lOnepartment of State, y.~. Relations with China, 
1944-~, P• 180. 
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"the United States and the other United Nations recognized 
the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China as the 
only legal government in China. 1111 This statement of 
President Truman, as concerned with the Hurley episode, was 
the only point of significance. Ambassador Hurley, himself, 
was only an incidental feature. The statement of the Pres-
ident indicated then that American support had been and 
would continue to be given to Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Nationalists. 
On the day after Hurley ~esigned, November 27, 1945 
President Truman announced his acceptance of the Ambassa-
dor's resignation and informed the American people of the 
appointment of General George C. Marshall as his Special 
Representative in China with the personal rank of Ambassa-
dor.12 The Marshall Mission indicates that American policy 
at that time was inspired by two objectives: bringing peace 
to China under conditions which would permit stable govern-
ment along democratic lines and assisting the Nationalist 
government to establish its authority over as wide an area 
of China as possible. The first objective was unrealized. 
The second objective the United States followed from 1945 to 
llHarry s. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and H5g) (Garden City! New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 19 , 
p. 69. Here nafter cited as Truman, Years of Trial. 
12ll.~- Relations with China, 1944-12!±.2., p. 132. 
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While attempting to form a unified government in China, 
General ~..arshall , in discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, found 
that Chiang was not willing to make the Communists a part of 
the government under any conditions which might lessen his 
own power. At the same time, in conferences with the Gom-
munists, he found that they also would not consent to any 
agreement which would weaken their position in China. 
While these conferences were occurring, the United 
States was furnishing supplies and equipment to the Nation-
alists. This continued until August, 1946, when Marshall 
embargoed shipments to the Nationalists due to the complaints 
of the Communists that the United States was not being im-
partial in the Chinese unification effort. The embargo was 
placed on supplies with the knowledge that it would have no 
great effect on the Chinese Nationalist position at that 
time. General Marshall himself testified to this fact by 
stating, 11 at that time the Chinese Government had sufficient 
munitions for their armies and there was no embarrassment to 
13Decade of American Foreign Policy, Senate Document 
123, 81st Cong.,lst Sess., Prepared at the request of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the 
Committee and Department of State (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1950), p. 721. 
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them. 1114 The embargo, therefore, had little effect upon 
American support of the Nationalist government. It contin-
ued as before, probably contributing to the unchangeable 
attitude of Chiang Kai-shek who thought he could still count 
on American aid whether or not he came to terms with the 
Communists and formed a unified government for China. With 
the attempts to form a unified China ending in failure, 
General Marshall was recalled at his own request. With his 
return the Marshall Mission became an example of the efforts 
of the American government to find a way to support Chiang 
Kai-shek under the circumstances of the internal strife and 
chaotic conditions within China during the postwar years. 
Following General Marshall's return to the United 
States it became an accepted fac t that in the carrying out 
of American policy and looking after American interests in 
China, the United States would have to support Chiang Kai-
shek while, at the same time, maintaining hope that he would 
be successful in his bid against the Chinese Communists. 
A further attempt to assist Chiang Kai-shek occurred 
on July 9, 1947, when Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer was 
sent to China on a fact-finding mission. 15 Relations between 
14congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 13289. 
15McNair, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, 
p. 543. 
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General Wedemeyer and Chiang Kai-shek, not only during the 
1947 mission but also during Wedemeyer's previous tour of 
duty in China, were carried on in a cordial and harmonious 
manner. Probably this was due to the fact that General 
Wedemeyer was one of the more ardent supporters of Chiang 
although he did recognize the weaknesses of the Nationalist 
government. General Wedemeyer, in his report written at the 
conclusion of his mission to China, made several recommen-
dations based on his observations. Some of his more signif-
icant recommendations were: that the United States govern-
ment provide moral, advisory, and material support to China. 16 
However, this aid was to be given with the stipulations that 
political and military reforms were to be carried out and 
that China was to accept American advisors in specified 
military and economic fields to assist in utilizing American 
aid in the manner for which it was intended.1 7 
In viewing the Wedemeyer mission of 1947 it is appa-
rent that the American government was still looking for some 
effective means of helping the Nationalist government and 
keeping Chiang Kai-shek in power as a means of preserving 
American interests in China. General Wedemeyer's report 
16Albert C. Wedemeyer~ WedemeSer Reports (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1958;, p. 47. 
17~. 
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pointed out that to be effective in aiding China and keeping 
Chiang Kai-shek in power American aid would have to oo on a 
large scale and would require a commitment of American 
Troops which the United States was not willing to make at 
that time.18 General Wedemeyer himself attributes the 
collapse of the Nationalist government on the mainland and 
the failure of Chiang Kai-shek to defeat the Communists to 
the fact that the United States failed to give Chiang ade-
quate support during the war and postwar years. 
Following the Wedemeyer mission, American aid to the 
Nationalists continued under the provisions of the 1948 
China Aid Act until Chiang Kai-shek's position in China 
appeared to be hopeless to the American government. Accord-
ing to President Truman, shipments t o the Nationalists were 
cut off when "many of Chiang's own generals took their armies, 
equipped through American aid, into the enemy camp. It was 
when that sort of surrender began to occur on a large scale 
that I decided to cut off further shipments to China. 1119 
When this began to happen, it was quite apparent that the 
American government had failed in its attempt to maintain 
Chiang Kai-shek in his position as head of the Nationalist 
18Fred Green 1 The Far East (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1957J, p. 529. 
19Truman, Years of Trial, p. 91. 
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government on the China mainland. With the collapse of the 
Nationalists on the mainland, the United States no longer 
had an agent to deal with in China. Further, United States 
relations with Chiang Kai-shek were directed toward 
maintaining his position on Formosa. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the twelve year period of 1937 to 1949, American 
relations with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek 
did show a consistency not apparent to the casual observer. 
During this time the primary point of American policy was to 
support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. With 
this point established, the reasons for it can be understood 
if consideration is given to the motives for carrying on 
diplomatic relations with any nation. Of great importance 
to the United States was the necessity of protecting its 
trade with China; secondly, but of no less importance was the 
matter of protecting American investments in China. A third 
motive and the most important of all considerations was the 
security of the United States. To achieve these three points 
Chiang Kai-shek, as the leader of the most stable faction in 
China, was selected as the most useful agent in implementing 
American policy. 
The United States, in attempting to keep Chiang Kai-
shek in power, furnished the Nationalist government with a 
considerable amount of aid but the dominant form of aid 
given was financial assistance. Actual military assistance 
to China was small as compared to that given to the other 
Allied nations in the same time period. 
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Previous to December 7, 1941, China was maintained as 
a counterbalance against Japanese power in the Far East. 
After this date American policy toward China was directed at 
keeping the Chinese actively in the war against Japan. To 
do this President Roosevelt felt that the greatest contri-
bution he could make to China was his effort to bestow 
ttgreat power" status upon China. Any more than this Presi-
dent Roosevelt was unable to do although Chiang Kai-shek 
very much wished to be represented at more of the top level 
conferences than he actually was. 
During the war years of 1942 to 1945 American policy, 
to many observers, seemed to be in its most confused state. 
This seemingly confused state of affairs applied in partic-
ular to the China-Burma-India ~heater of operations. 
However, the over all American policy remained consistent 
with that of the previous years although in doing so it 
meant sacrificing the able leadership of such a person as 
General Joseph Stilwell. It was also during this period 
that the first doubts as to the advisability of the whole-
hearted, unqualified support of Chiang Kai-shek began to 
arise . Such sentiments eventually reached the Department of 
State through the reports of Foreign Service officers in 
China but no restraining action was taken. 
In the postwar years American policy toward China and 
Chiang Kai-shek did change in the respect that the American 
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government came to favor a unified coalition government con-
sisting of all groups in China although retention of Chiang 
Kai-shek's position of leadership was still desired. How-
ever, there were some American officials who thought Chiang 
Kai-shek should be completely dropped. Prominent among this 
group were John Davies, John Service, Raymond Ludden, and 
John Emerson. All of these men were former members of the 
United States Embassy staff in Chungking. Also General 
Joseph Stilwell and former Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss were 
very critical of Chiang. In their relations with Chiang, 
the American officials who supported him and did not attempt 
to get him to make any extensive use of his forces were 
praised by Chiang. However, those who did not do so were 
highly criticized. 
With the hope of a unified coalition Chinese govern-
ment in mind, the mission of General George C. Marshall was 
arranged and later the fact finding mission of General 
Albert c. Wedemeyer. These two missions indicate the Ameri-
can government was looking for a solution to the China pro-
blem when no solution existed under the circumstances of 
that time. The United States would not make the commitments 
of troops and supplies which observers believed to be the 
only solution to arranging a stable government in China. 
The American government was caught in the dilemma of 
wanting to assist Chiang Kai-shek and keep him in power but 
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at the same time the United States would not make the neces-
sary commitments to accomplish this. If the American govern-
ment had made the necessary commitments, it probably would 
have involved the United States in the Chinese Civil War and 
possibly war with Russia. The decision of the American 
government was to do what was possible for Chiang Kai-shek 
without making any large scale commitments. Ultimately this 
was not enough and Chiang's forces were defeated on the 
mainland and collapsed. When this happened, the United 
States no longer had an agent in China with whom it could 
deal. 
During inquiries and investigations of American po-
licy and actions in regard to China , the Department of State 
was highly criticized. However, the Department of State 
actually did not have control over what American policy in 
China was nor how it was carried out. In many matters con-
cerning China President Roosevelt by-passed the State De-
partment. He made extensive use of personal representatives. 
Also the carrying out of American policy was delegated to 
American military officials who were almost wholly respon-
sible for the conduct of affairs within China. State 
Department officials were never involved in any way other 
than in an advisory capacity. Considering these facts, the 
Department of State could not be held responsible, in any 
great degree, for the collapse of the Nationalist government 
on the Chinese mainland. The end result could only be 
attributed to an aggregate of many factors. 
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